

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

Political Problems

1. Soviet Motives and intentions: The Working Group has provisionally agreed upon a report on Soviet motives and intentions. The U.S. delegation has pouched a copy to the Department but it has not yet been received.

2. Timing of offer of negotiations: There seemed to be general agreement with the U.S. position that we should act to bring about negotiations before the Soviet sign a peace treaty with the East German regime, having first established a stronger western position. The French and German continue, however, to reveal some doubts.

3. Forum for negotiations: The Working Group has discussed various forums, including Ambassadorial talks in Moscow and a Foreign Ministers Conference, without yet reaching any agreement. There was, however, a general lack of enthusiasm for the West proposing a peace conference.

4. Scope of negotiations: There was general agreement that negotiations should initially be on Germany and Berlin, though they might end up with Berlin alone. It was also agreed that it would be unrealistic to include disarmament in view of the separate course of disarmament talks since 1959.

5. Substance

July 27, 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Through: G and S/S

From: S/O T. C. Achilles

Subject: Status Report on Paris Working Group Meeting on Berlin.

The Working Group adopted the following agenda:

1. Political problems.
2. Politico military problems, including contingency planning.
3. Economic phases contingency planning.
4. Information program.

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S. C. Helms

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Berlin

5. Substance of negotiations. The Working Group discussed at some length the possible substance of negotiations. It agreed that the Western "Peace Plan" should not be rewritten at the present time, except for simplifying it and updating particularly its disarmament features. The consensus of the group was that discussion of frontiers (the Oder-Neisse line) should be avoided. The Working Group agreed to recommend a study under supervision of Washington Ambassadorial group of proposals regarding measures against surprise attack. The Group agreed that the Western powers could not negotiate with the east German regime regarding access to Berlin. It also agreed that the West should not put forward the July 28, 1959, proposals (TAB A) as Western starting position. Mr. Kohler suggested resubmitting the April 21, 1960, report of the Working Group on "Essential Conditions for an Arrangement for West Berlin" (TAB B) to the Ministers.

6. United Nations. The Working Group has asked the U.S., U.K., and French missions in New York and the Federal Republic's observer to the UN to study the ways in which the UN might become involved in the Berlin problem. The Group asked that the missions submit a preliminary report by August 5.

7. Access procedures. Not yet discussed in Working Group. Mr. Kohler has discussed this subject on the side with the British and Germans. The British Foreign office representative continued to press for the acceptance of the present procedures.

Politico-military problems, including contingency planning

The British, French, and German delegates have generally approved of President Kennedy's "double barrel" approach to preparations and negotiations. They have indicated, however, reservation about a large scale ground probe. Mr. Kohler has promised to table proposals regarding Berlin access and a possible directive regarding Live Oak. The Department has sent Mr. Kohler instructions on this subject.

Economic phases contingency planning

A sub-group of the four-power Working Group has accepted the considerations in the U.S. paper handed to the U.K., French and German Ambassadors on July 21. The sub-group also reached the following general conclusions: (a) the Foreign Ministers should decide to enforce a total embargo on the Soviet Bloc in the event of substantial blockage of access to Berlin, and the other NATO countries should be urged to join in this action; (b) it is considered unlikely that neutral countries could be persuaded to join in an embargo; however, this will be probably explored with them if an embargo stage is reached. The British, in particular, are opposed to

applying

applying sanctions to the Sino-Soviet Bloc, regarding such action as politically undesirable and tending to strengthen Chinese-Soviet ties. The Germans hold strongly to the need for maintaining inter-zonal trade unless there is substantial interference with civil access, as distinguished from allied access, to Berlin and within Berlin.

In summary, the sub-group expects to reach a large measure of agreement on the economic countermeasures facet, including recommendations looking to practical adoption of a NATO-wide program of countermeasures.

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TEXT OF WESTERN PROPOSAL OF JULY 28, 1959

BERLIN

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have examined the question of Berlin in the desire to find mutually satisfactory solutions to the problems which have been raised and which derive essentially from the division of Berlin and of Germany. They agreed that the best solution for these problems would be the reunification of Germany. They recognize, however, that meanwhile the existing situation and the agreements at present in force can be modified in certain respects and have consequently agreed upon the following:

(A) The Soviet Foreign Minister has made known the decision of the Soviet Government no longer to maintain forces in Berlin.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that it is the intention of their Governments to limit the combined total of their forces in Berlin to the present figure (approximately 11,000). The three Ministers further declare that their Governments will from time to time discuss the possibility of reducing such forces if developments permit.

B) The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States further declare that it is the intention of their Governments to continue not to locate atomic weapons or missile installations in West Berlin.

C) Free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water, and by air for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the forces of the Western Powers stationed in Berlin, will be maintained in accordance with the procedures in effect in April 1959. Freedom of movement will continue to be maintained between East and West Berlin. All disputes which might arise with respect to access will be raised and settled between the four Governments. The latter will establish a quadripartite commission which will meet in Berlin to examine in the first instance any difficulties arising in connection with access and will seek to settle such difficulties. The commission may make arrangements, if necessary, to consult German experts.

D) Measures will be taken, consistent with fundamental rights and liberties, to avoid activities in or with respect to Berlin which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or amount to interference in the internal affairs of others. The Secretary General of the United Nations will be requested to provide a representative, supported by adequate staff, to be established in Berlin, with free access to all parts of the city for the purpose of reporting to the Secretary General any propaganda activities which appear to be in conflict with the foregoing principles. The four Governments will consult with the Secretary General in order to determine the appropriate action to be taken in respect to any such report.

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(E) The arrangements specified in sub-paragraphs 'A) through 'D) above can in the absence of reunification be reviewed at any time after five years by the Foreign Ministers' Conference as now constituted, if such review is requested by any of the four Governments.

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ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS FOR AN ARRANGEMENT
FOR WEST BERLIN

(Modified Version of Original Working Group Paper Which Might
Serve as Basis for Presentation to the Soviets)

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the
United States consider that the following conditions are
essential for an acceptable arrangement relating to West Berlin:

- a. Such an arrangement must be compatible with the continu-
ance of basic Allied occupation rights until changed or terminated
with the consent of the Occupying Powers.
- b. Such an arrangement must permit Allied forces to be main-
tained at an appropriate strength to assure the security and
internal order of West Berlin.
- c. Any agreement embodying such an arrangement must be con-
cluded only among the Four Powers.
- d. Such an arrangement should avoid the creation of new
obstacles to eventual German reunification and should not prejudice
Berlin's role as the future all-German capital.
- e. Such an arrangement should permit the continuance of
existing ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany.
- f. Such an arrangement should not further erode the unity of
the City of Berlin. Such an arrangement must deal not only with
West Berlin but also with the elements of the Berlin problem which
arise from the situation in the rest of the city and in the sur-
rounding area.
- g. Such an arrangement must maintain freedom of access to
Berlin at its present level and should improve conditions of access.
- h. Nothing in such an arrangement should make more difficult
the continuance of a constitutional government in West Berlin based
on free elections and guaranteeing democratic process and civil rights.
- i. Such an arrangement must be acceptable to the people of
West Berlin.

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